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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A repair shop does not owe a duty of care to a tow truck driver who is summoned
to move a vehicle disabled by its repair. The trial court erred when it held a repair shop
owes such a duty.
ARGUMENT
L

Sound policy judgment dictates a repair shop owes no duty to a tow truck
driver.
A. The facts surrounding this particular accident do not bear on the issue
of duty
When it remanded this matter, the Utah Supreme Court set forth the standard for

determining whether Hansen owe Mr. Normandeau a duty of care. Notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's guidance, plaintiffs argue that when analyzing the duty issue, this case
involves unique facts and circumstances that justify looking beyond "the abstract
proposition" of "whether a repair shop owes a duty to a tow truck driver." Appellees' Br.
at 15 and 16. Although the only issue before this court is a purely legal one—whether a
duty is owed—plaintiffs cloud the analysis of duty with facts that relate instead to the
accident. For example, plaintiffs state:
"Hanson Equipment's negligent repair.. .caused unforeseen torque to
build up in the truck's drive line." Id. at 1.
"The negligent repair also caused torque to build up in the drive line."
Id. at 4.
"Because of the leak in the hose that Hanson had spliced on, a huge
amount of torque had built up in the drive line as the truck came to a
stop." Id. at 9.

"Hanson's negligent repair.,, caused an excessive amount of torque to
build up in the drive line." Id. at 13.
"...Hanson tries to avoid one of the central facts of this case, namely,
that Hanson's negligent repair of the Ryder truck's hydraulic line did
not just cause the truck to break down, requiring the services of a tow
truck driver, but also created the very hazard that killed Mr.
Normandeau." Id. at 15.
Because this theme runs throughout plaintiffs' brief, Hanson Equipment needs to
respond. To be clear, Hanson Equipment assumes on appeal it negligently repaired a
hose in the hydraulic line for the brakes and power steering, which caused the hydraulic
line to lose fluid. A picture of where the hose that failed was located under the hood is
attached in the Addendum, as well as a picture of the driveline underneath the truck. As
plaintiffs' expert mechanical engineer explains:
The improper hydraulic line repair by Hansen Equipment directly caused
that same hydraulic line to spring a leak allowing the escape of hydraulic
fluid from the line. This loss of hydraulic fluid caused the truck's power
steering to cease to operate, and also caused the driveline parking brake to
engage as an emergency measure to stop the truck. The loss of hydraulic
fluid from the broken hydraulic hose thus disabled the truck, rendering it
not driveable, and requiring it to be towed.
Because the truck now had to be towed, the driveline had to be disengaged
from the rear drive wheels so as not to damage the transmission of the
truck. That job had to be done by a professional tow truck operator such as
Dennis Normandeau.
(R. at 808-809, at ff> and 10.)

1

The picture under the hood is Trial Exhibit 12, and the picture underneath the truck is
Trial Exhibit 7, both of which are included in the Record in the folder labeled Trial
Exhibits, 1 of 2.
2

In other words, the reason the parking brake engages when a hydraulic system loses
pressure is because that is how the truck's hydraulic system is designed to operate.
Torque occurred in the truck's driveline when the parking brake engaged. (R. at 809,
f 11.) The failure of a hydraulic hose would not cause the parking brake to engage absent
the manufacturer designing the system to operate in that manner.
Therefore, it is a stretch for plaintiffs to argue that the negligent repair caused
unforeseen torque to build up in the driveline or even that torque is a rare or unexpected
occurrence in drivelines. What is more accurate, and supported by plaintiffs expert in
the Record, is that the negligent repair caused the hydraulic line to leak fluid, which
affected the efficacy of the brakes and power steering, and caused the truck's failsafe
emergency design to engage the parking brake . This is not a situation where special
circumstances caused torque to build up in the driveline. When the parking brake
engages, torque naturally occurs, which is why with every professional wrecker is aware
of torque and must check for and relieve the torque. (R. at 813).
Although Hansen wanted to clarify the nature of the events, these facts are largely
irrelevant to whether a duty of care is owed. As the Supreme Court noted, "Foreseeability
as a factor in determining duty does not relate to the specifics of the alleged tortious

Plaintiffs expert further explains, "This truck's design has a hydro-boost system where
both the power steering and power brakes are supplied from a single hydraulic pump. The
parking brake system also uses hydraulic pressure from the same pump. All three systems,
that is, brake boost, power steering and parking brake release, utilize the same hydraulic
fluid, pump and reservoir. A leak in any one of those system components will render the
vehicle without service brake boost, power steering, or parking brake release." (R. at
807, H3).
3

conduct but rather to the general relationship between the alleged tortfeasor and the
victim. Whether a harm was foreseeable in the context of determining duty depends on
the general foreseeability of such harm, not whether the specific mechanism of the harm
could be foreseen." NormandeauII, 2009 UT 44, ^[20 (citation omitted). And, although
"factual issues may bear on the issue of foreseeability as it relates to duty, [Normandeau]
is not such a case.. ..The court had the undisputed facts necessary to examine the legal
relationships between the parties and analyze the duties created by these relationships."
Id. at ^[21 (citations omitted). We turn now to the general relationship of the parties and
the general foreseeability of harm.
B.

The legal relationship of the parties and the foreseeability of harm.

The attenuated relationship of the parties here favors a finding that no duty of care
is owed to the tow truck driver. Hanson Equipment incorrectly repaired a hose in a
vehicle that rendered it inoperable, which required the services of a professional to move
it to a subsequent repair shop. The wrecker driver's task with this tow was the same as all
tows of large vehicles—relieve the torque so the driveline can be removed. If this Court
were to assign a duty here, then it would also have to assign a duty of care to all
professionals from these who find themselves in need of their services—an extension of
liability beyond sound public policy. Public policy favors holding tow truck drivers to the
standard of care required by their profession. A repair shop does not owe a duty to avoid
creating the need for a tow truck driver.

4

The occupation of a tow truck driver is, by its nature, hazardous. Towers work in
precarious places under stressful conditions around dangerous equipment. The likelihood
of injury to a tow truck driver is very low when, as here, a hydraulic line fails and renders
a truck inoperable. These professionals know how important it is to certain precautions,
which includes, checking for torque when disassembling drivelines. It is not foreseeable
to a repair shop or anyone else that a professional would be injured while preparing a
vehicle for towing. On the other hand, what is generally foreseeable from the negligent
repair of a hydraulic hose is that the truck will lose power from the hydraulic line and the
operator will have to navigate the vehicle to safety. In that scenario, the truck operator
and those in his or her path to safety fall within the realm of foreseeability of harm.
The trial court erred when it denied Hanson's motion for summary judgment. The
trial court's ruling failed to recognize the parties attenuated relationship did not warrant
the imposition of a duty of care. Moreover, the circumstances that brought the parties
together similarly does not require a duty of care. The trial court's finding of a duty
conflicts with fundamental policy considerations which weigh against finding those in
need of professional assistance also owing a duty of care with respect to the professional
service rendered.
II.

Hanson equipment preserved the issue of whether a duty of care is owed and
may cite persuasive authority to support its arguments on the issue.
The professional rescuer doctrine is not an affirmative defense, nor is it an "issue"

on appeal which must be preserved. Moreover, this doctrine was raised to the trial court
and addressed in Hanson's docketing statement to this court. Plaintiffs have failed to
5

provide this Court with any authority to support the argument that a party must cite all
authority to the trial court it intends to use on appeal in order to preserve the authority for
appeal. As plaintiffs point out in their brief, Hanson Equipment merely argued the
doctrine was analogous to case at hand and the reasoning underlying the doctrine is
persuasive on the issue before this court—namely whether Hanson Equipment owed
Normandeau a duty of care. As persuasive authority on an issue that was timely asserted
and preserved for appeal, Hanson Equipment can cite to the case and argue why its
reasoning applies to the issue before this court. Plaintiffs have not pointed to any case
law, and Hanson Equipment is unaware of any, that would preclude a party from citing
additional authority in support of an argument that was adequately preserved and argued
to the trial court. Because Hanson Equipment preserved the issue for appeal, this Court
should decline plaintiffs' invitation to ignore it and consider whether the reasoning
underlying the professional rescuer doctrine is applicable to the issue of whether a duty of
care is owed.
III.

Occasioning the need for a professional is insufficient to impose a duty of care
when the injury is within the anticipated scope of risks associated with the
profession.
Hanson Equipment owed Mr. Normandeau no duty of care when it merely created

the need for his response in his professional capacity as a tow truck driver. In assessing
the professional rescuer doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court noted that assigning duties of
care and tort law are "saturated with judicial policy judgments." See Fordham v.
Oldroyd, 2007 UT 74, ^4, 171 P.3d 411. In determining whether to impose a duty in
6

Fordham, the Court noted the analysis turned on the following: "(1) whether the injury
was derived from the negligence that occasioned the professional rescuer's response, and
(2) whether the injury was within the scope of those risks inherent in the professional
rescuer's duties." Id. at ^}6. This analysis is not all that different from more traditional
duty of care analysis which looks at "policy judgments applied to relationships." See id.
at 1f4 (quoting Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47,1J17, 143 P.3d 283).
Accordingly, Hanson Equipment cited this Court to the Fordham decision as persuasive
authority when applied to the facts of this matter.
Taking the fects as plaintiffs argue them, this matter does not present a policy
justification for imposing a duty of care to this highly attenuated relationship. Hanson
Equipment is a repair shop in Colorado, and Mr. Normandeau was a large wrecker driver
in Utah. Hanson Equipment's repair created the need for a tow truck. Applying the
analysis in Fordham to these facts, however, does not support the trial court's conclusion
that Hanson Equipment owed Mr. Normandeau a duty of care.
As discussed in Fordham, Hanson Equipment's negligence created the need for
Mr. Normandeau to be on the scene in order to tow the Ryder truck. Hanson Equipment
does not understand plaintiffs to be arguing that merely creating the need for a tow truck
driver automatically creates a duty of care between the parties. Indeed, this position
would create such a broad rule as to impose virtually limitless duties of care to
professionals whose job it is to repair broken items. Moreover, such a rule would make
people in need of professional assistance guarantors of a professional's safety. The social
7

and policy implications of this rule would be too great to impose such a broad duty.
For example, if a homeowner became angry and kicked a furnace, does the
homeowner owe the furnace repairman a duty of care when the professional comes to
repair the furnace? The homeowner occasioned the need for the repair by negligently
kicking the furnace, causing it to need a repair. Fordham and other cases in Utah such as
Yazd indicate the homeowner does not owe a duty of care. If the rule were otherwise,
people would never seek professionals to respond to any situation in which negligence
occasioned the need for a professional response.
The second part of Fordham looks at whether the injury was within the scope of
risks inherent in the professional's duties in response. See Fordham, 2007 UT 74 at ^J6.
This issue appears to be the crux of plaintiffs' arguments on appeal. Specifically,
Normandeaus argue the negligent repair created the torque in the driveline. The presence
of torque in a truck's driveline, however, is common to tows of all large trucks. Tow
truck drivers are taught to check for torque. Even Mr. Normandeau's own supervisor,
Kyle Bundy, and Normandeau's expert witness, Jesse Enriquez, offered opinions about
the presence of torque. (R. at 620-21; 812-16). Specifically, Mr. Enriquez stated: "It
appears that Dennis Normandeau was aware of driveline torque and was familiar with the
process for removing a driveline in preparing a truck for towing." (R. at 813). Mr. Bundy
taught Mr. Normandeua how to check for and relieve torque (R. at 660, at 25:7-23), and
Mr. Normandeau towed vehicles with a similar brake system three to five times a month.
(R. at 621, 666 at 50:21-51:18.)
8

Taking the furnace hypothetical one step further, suppose when the homeowner
kicks the furnace, the kick causes an electrical wire to become exposed and to electrically
charge a part in the furnace which under normal circumstances would not be electrified.
Would this fact cause the homeowner to now owe a duty of care to the repairman who
was called on scene? If in the furnace repair industry the possibility of electrocution is a
known and accepted hazard, does this knowledge change the analysis? If because of this
known hazard the standard practice for a repairman is to turn off the electricity before
investigating the reason for the repair, does the analysis change yet again?
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this question, and answered it in the negative.
See Fordham, 2007 UT 74 at ^[6. The presence of torque in a truck's driveline is a known
and accepted risk inherent to tow truck drivers in their profession. Plaintiffs' own expert
stated that Mr. Normandeau was aware of torque in drivelines. Absent facts to show the
negligence created a situation outside the normal risks inherent in the profession, the
person occasioning the need for a professional does not owe a general duty of care.
Certain industries and professions are inherently dangerous; however, creating the
need for the profession does not make a person a guarantor of the professional's safety
when performing the job. Moreover, it does not create a duty of care between the
professional and the person who needs the professional's service. If the rule were
otherwise, nobody would enlist the services of professionals for fear of personal liability
if the professional was inexperienced, lacked specific knowledge, or was harmed by
known risks associated with the profession. Accordingly, Hanson requests this Court to
9

reverse the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment on the legal issue of
whether a duty of care is owed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred when it denied Hanson Equipment's motion for summary
judgment on the legal issue of whether a duty of care was owed to Mr. Normandeau. The
relationship of the parties is too attenuated to assign a duty of care, and the injury
sustained by Mr. Normandeau was highly unlikely and not generally foreseeable. Mr.
Normandeau responded to a need for his professional services. His injury was caused by
a risk known to all professionals in his industry. Based on these facts, Hanson Equipment
was entitled to summary judgment, and this matter should not have been submitted to the
jury.
X

4<—

DATED this <^_ day of February, 2010.
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON

ttorneysfor Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc.
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